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ARTICLES
INTERPRETING THE RELIGION CLAUSES IN TERMS
OF LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND FREE SPEECH





Substantial arguments suggest that the charitable choice
provisions of the recent welfare reform act may be unconstitu-
tional under current Supreme Court authority.1 An analysis
based on current authority may only be of limited utility, how-
ever. The Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause
does not represent stable constitutional doctrine today. Change
is in the wind, although the Court continues to be fragmented as
to the direction in which doctrine should move.2 Because of this
doctrinal uncertainty, the focus of this article is less on what is
and more on what o'ught to be. The requirements of existing
precedent notwithstanding, several commentators have proposed
alternative interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause and the
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; B.A. 1969, Antioch
College; J.D. 1977, Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Vikram
Amar, John Garvey, and Tom Berg for reading drafts of this article and
providing helpful criticism. I also wish to acknowledge the help I received from
my research assistants, Maura Shortley and Emily Weaver, and from Research
Librarian Peg Darkin.
1. See Alan Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Charitable Choice, in
WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONs 219 (Derek H. Davis & Barry
Hankins eds., 1999).
2. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (overruling Aguilarv.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985) in a 5-4 decision permitting the provision of state-funded remedial
educational services by public employees at parochial schools); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (requiring public
university to fund sectarian religious periodical along with other student
journals published in a limited public forum in a 5-4 decision limited by Justice
O'Connor's narrow concurring opinion).
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Establishment Clause that would allow the charitable choice pro-
visions to be upheld against constitutional challenge.3 This
paper is a critical response to that commentary.
I. WHAT IS "NEuTRALITY THEORY"?
Professor Carl Esbeck, who participated in the drafting of
the charitable choice provisions,4 described one such constitu-
tional model which he refers to as "neutrality theory" in a recent
article in the Emory Law Review.5 Other scholars have proposed
variations of a neutrality theory that track Esbeck's description in
some respects but differ from it in others.6 Given Esbeck's role
in developing the charitable choice legislation, however, it seems
appropriate to focus on the interpretation of the Constitution
that he endorses in discussing potential shifts in doctrine that
might justify this statutory scheme.7
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX:
RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY (1996); Carl H.
Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social
Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of
Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997); Michael McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115 (1992).
4. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 44.
5. See Esbeck, supra note 3, at 20.
6. Professor Esbeck, for example, contends that neutrality theory justifies
exempting religiously motivated conduct but not comparable secular acts of
conscience from the application of neutral laws of general applicability. See
Esbeck, supra note 3, at 23-27. Professor Laycock, oh the other hand, has
argued that it is "essential to the pursuit of religious neutrality [that] the law
should protect nontheists' deeply held conscientious objection to compliance
with civil law to the same extent that it protects the theistically motivated
conscientious objection of traditional believers." Douglas Laycock, Religious
Liberty as Liberty, 7J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 331 (1996). Similarly, Esbeck
appears to suggest that under neutrality theory, government speech must follow
"a separationist model" and cannot endorse or advocate religious beliefs.
Esbeck, supra note 3, at 23 n.87. Professor McConnell, in contrast, would allow
government speech that endorses religious beliefs. See McConnell, supra note
3, at 170-75.
7. The idea of neutrality as it relates to the religion clauses can mean so
many different things to so many different people that it is impossible to write a
relatively brief article criticizing neutrality theory without limiting discussion to
one specific version of the model. See generally, Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Desegregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. Rv. 993
(1990) (describing the range of meanings attributed to neutrality in religion
clause jurisprudence). In addition to focusing on the description of neutrality
theory in Professor Esbeck's Emory Law Journal article, supra note 3, I also
frequently refer to the Amici Curiae brief [hereinafter Brief] of the Christian
Legal Society, the Coalition for Christian Colleges & Universities, and the
Union of OrthodoxJewish Congregations of America filed in the U.S. Court of
Appeals, Fourth Circuit in support of plaintiff-appellant in Columbia Union
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The goal of neutrality theory, according to Esbeck, is to
"maximize[ ] religious liberty."8 That objective is best accom-
plished by
the minimization of the government's influence over per-
sonal choices concerning religious beliefs and practices.
The goal is realized when government is neutral as to the
religious choices of its citizens. Thus, whether pondering
the constitutionality of exemptions from regulatory bur-
dens or of equal treatment as to benefit programs, in both
situations the integrating principle is neutralizing the
impact of government action on personal religious
choices.9
Neutrality theory implements this integration by "distinguishing
between burdens and benefits." Under its operational rules, min-
imization of government influence is achieved by "(1) allowing
religious providers equal access to [state] benefits, and (2)
allowing them separate relief from regulatory burdens."'"
Pursuant to this distinction, when state regulations of con-
duct are at issue, the disproportionate impact, substantive ine-
quality, and burdens on liberty that result from the application of
ostensibly neutral laws of general applicability to people of differ-
ent religious faiths are precluded under neutrality theory by a
constitutional mandate requiring the state to grant exemptions
from such laws for religiously motivated conduct. When govern-
ment spending decisions are challenged, however, "the neutrality
principle is not conc~ined with unintended effects among reli-
gions. Accordingly, the Establishment Clause is not offended
should a general program of aid affect, for good or ill, some reli-
gious providers more than others, as long as any disparate effect
is unintentional."" Thus, neutrality theory does not appear to
recognize any distortion of incentives arising from the allocation
of state funds to even pervasively sectarian religious organizations
for the provision of secular public services as long as the funds
are awarded on the basis of facially neutral criteria. Or at least it
College v. Clarke, 988 F. Supp. 897 (1997). In Columbia Union College, the district
court upheld the denial of state financial aid to a private college affiliated with
the Seventh-Day Adventist Church on the grounds that the college was a
pervasively sectarian religious institution. Professor Esbeck's name is on the
brief although he is not listed as Counsel of Record.
8. Esbeck, supra note 3, at 27.
9. Id. at 26.
10. Id. at 24.
11. Id. at 38-39.
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does not recognize that any such distortion of incentives would
be constitutionally significant.
1 2
What is unacceptable to neutrality theory is the denial of
funding to pervasively sectarian religious organizations. This
departure from neutrality between secular and religious organi-
zations imposes a transformative burden on religious subsidy
recipients. By conditioning governmental support on a religious
organization not being pervasively sectarian, the state in essence
requires that religious organizations must change themselves in a
fundamental way into something they are not in order to be eligi-
ble to receive state grants. Religious organizations are not
treated neutrally when they must surrender their identity to
receive the same level of support as secular organizations per-
forming comparable functions.
Indeed, under neutrality theory, the primary concern with
the funding of religious organizations is ensuring that they be as
unrestricted and free from regulation as possible in maintaining
their sectarian character while using state resources for public
purposes.1" It is a departure from neutrality if, as a consequence
of receiving state financial support, a religious organization must
jeopardize the special protection of its institutional autonomy
that religious institutions have traditionally been provided. Reli-
gion is not impermissibly advanced when sectarian religious
organizations maintain their religious character while receiving
state grants that are distributed under neutral criteria because
state subsidies do not constitute special benefits to the organiza-
tions that receive them. As long as the public receives full value
in secular services and results from the religious organizations'
use of public funds, the effect of the subsidy on religion is, well,
"neutral," and, therefore, constitutionally acceptable.
II. A CRITIQUE OF "NEuTRALITY THEORY"
While there are several conceptual and practical difficulties
with neutrality theory and its goal of minimizing government's
influence over personal choices relating to religious beliefs and
practices, for the purposes of this paper, I intend to focus on
three criticisms. First, despite its name and billing, neutrality
theory really isn't very neutral. Far from minimizing government
incentives relating to religious decisions, the theory tolerates and
even encourages government decisions that will influence reli-
gious choices and behavior. Second, the theory is misdirected in
its objective. In attempting to interpret the religion clauses solely
12. See id. at 21.
13. See id
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in terms of constitutional constraints on government interfer-
ence with religious liberty, neutrality theory fails to take into
account other important and relevant constitutional values. As
an alternative to the goal of protecting liberty through a commit-
ment to government neutrality, I suggest that the religion clauses
should be interpreted to serve two primary substantive values,
religious liberty and religious equality, while avoiding to the
extent possible any undue distortion of a competitive market-
place of ideas regarding the basic beliefs of citizens. Third, with
its emphasis on eliminating government influence on religious
choices and behavior, neutrality theory pays inadequate atten-
tion to the positive role that government should play in promot-
ing religious liberty and equality.
A. The Lack of Neutrality in Neutrality Theory
Perhaps the most glaring defect of neutrality theory is its
lack of commitment to neutrality itself. In theory and practice,
neutrality theory does not live up to its own ideals, whether we
are talking about neutrality between secular and religious belief
systems or neutrality among religious faiths.
Neutrality theory claims that its goal is "the minimization of
government's influence over personal choices concerning reli-
gious beliefs and practices."14 One would presume that this
objective precludes government actions that create incentives for
or against engaging in religious practices or adopting religious
beliefs. The theory does not explain, however, how granting
exemptions for religiously motivated conduct, but not acts of sec-
ular conscience, promotes such a neutral result.
A system of free exercise exemptions or statutory accommo-
dations of only religiously motivated conduct promotes religious
beliefs and practices in a variety of respects. As a general matter
such a legal regime creates the impression that religious moral
principles are more worthy of respect than secular beliefs. Fur-
ther, religious moral convictions provide a more useful value sys-
tem to the individual under this framework because they free the
individual from the risks and burdens associated with being sub-
ject to inconsistent requirements. If a person influenced by both
secular and religious values is told that the government will only
respect the individual's acts of conscience if they are derived
from religious sources, an incentive is created to look to one's
religious beliefs to justify moral conduct.'"
14. Id. at 26.
15. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager discuss at length the ways
in which broad-based constitutional or statutory exemptions for religiously
1999]
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No one suggests that these general incentives will draw secu-
lar individuals irresistibly to spiritual life.1 6 They operate incre-
mentally on the margin and cumulatively. If the situation were
reversed and only secular acts of conscience were exempted from
general laws, however, I would be hard pressed to deny that such
a framework created incentives favoring secular beliefs.
Recognizing that the provision of regulatory exemptions for
religiously motivated conduct creates incentives that favor reli-
motivated conduct favor religion in several articles. See, e.g., Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City
of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 104-22 (1997) [hereinafter
Congressional Power]; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutiona4 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 437, 444-60
(1994) [hereinafter Unconstitutional]. They conclude, I think correctly, that the
exemption of religiously motivated conduct from general laws proposed by
neutrality theory, standing alone, "radically favors religious motivation, by
giving it and it alone a presumptive immunity from state regulation. It is
precisely this favoritism which is normatively indefensible, and precisely this
favoritism which makes exemption seem so much like subsidy. Redescribing it
as neutrality does not solve the problem on either score." Congressional Power at
118.
As an alternative to "neutrality theory," Eisgruber and Sager offer an
'equality theory" of the religion clauses under which "government's
fundamental obligation is to treat all deep personal commitments equally,
regardless of whether those commitments are secular or religious, mainstream
or unusual." Congressional Power at 123. The foundation of this approach is the
authors' contention that there is nothing sufficiently unique about religion that
justifies assigning it a fundamentally distinct status in constitutional law. Thus,
"there is no constitutional justification for the privileging of religion,"
Unconstitutional at 448, and no persuasive reason "why churches should not be
eligible for government benefits on the same terms as comparable secular
enterprises, including, for example, private schools and secular charities."
Congressional Power at 138.
My own view, which might be described as a "liberty, equality and speech
theory," recognizes religion to be special for constitutional purposes in a variety
of ways that justify both exempting religiously motivated conduct from neutral
laws of general applicability and treating religious institutions differently than
secular ones with regard to the funding of public services. From Eisgruber and
Sager's perspective, my view might be characterized as a form of quid pro quo
approach, in which "the Free Exercise Clause gives back [to religion] some of
what the Establishment clause takes away." Congressional Power at 121
(describing Abner Greene's analysis of the religion clauses in The Political
Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993)).
16. Similarly, when critics of the marginalization of religion in public life
argue that eliminating religious displays from the public square creates
incentives in favor of secular beliefs, see W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Alexander
Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism, and the Transformative Dimension of Religion
Institutions, 1993 BYU L. REv. 421, 44246, 455-60 (1993); McConnell, supra note
3, at 188-94, they are not suggesting that religious people in droves will
renounce their faith if the government becomes less overt in celebrating
religious holidays.
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gion does not establish that such exemptions are constitutionally
impermissible.17 Indeed, in many cases I believe religious
exemptions are constitutionally justified if not required. Evalu-
ated in isolation, there is often a persuasive argument that grant-
ing an exemption for a religious practice distorts incentives in
favor of religion far less substantially than the incentives against
religious practice that are created if the exemption is denied.
This does not mean, however, that the incentives in favor of
religion that the granting of exemptions creates are constitution-
ally irrelevant and never need to be taken into account. On the
contrary, I suggest that the development of constitutional stan-
dards to further the goal of incentive neutrality requires a wider
and more holistic perspective. If regulatory exemptions result in
incentives favoring religion, the granting of exemptions creates
an imbalance in the constitutional ledger that may help tojustify
other decisions, creating countervailing incentives, that move the
system closer to equilibrium. It is this lack of attention to the
consequences of granting religious exemptions that calls the
commitment of neutrality theory to true incentive neutrality into
question.
Even if we direct our focus exclusively to specific exemp-
tions, it seems clear that certain religious exemptions, those that
are of independent secular benefit to the individual being
relieved of a legal burden, may powerfully influence personal
behavior toward religion or a particular faith.18 Conscientious
objector exemptions from military conscription arguably create
this kind of an incentive. Laws that require private or public
employers to accommodate the religious practices of employees,
such as a law requiring firms to provide religious employees time
off from work to observe their Sabbath, may have a similar
effect.19 It is not too difficult to imagine a firm in which most
employees desire weekend days off to be with their families, but
only the religious employees are given Saturday or Sunday off so
17. Let me be absolutely clear that I strongly favor providing free exercise
exemptions for religiously motivated conduct. I simply do not believe that
providing these exemptions to religious individuals alone can be defended as
"neutral" or as minimizing government influence over personal choices relating
to religion. We do not maximize neutrality by evaluating the grounds for an
exemption in isolation and then ignoring the incentive consequences that
result when the exemption is granted.
18. See Laycock, supra note 7, at 1016-18 (recognizing the problem
created by such exemptions and the need to subject such claims to special
analysis).
19. See, e.g., Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (evaluating the
constitutionality of a law requiring employers to give employees time off to
observe the Sabbath).
1999]
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they may comply with the obligations of their faith. If attending
church or synagogue services for an hour some Saturdays or Sun-
days is sufficient to establish eligibility for this accommodation, it
would not be surprising to discover that some individuals dis-
cover a renewed interest in attending religious services when that
is the price to pay for having the rest of the day off with their
families."z
Neutrality theory is even more deficient in its approach to
government spending and the disproportionate impact of facially
neutral spending programs among various religious faiths.
Surely, all the criticism of the Supreme Court's decision in
Employment Division v. Smith21 and the battles over the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")22 established one
important principle of religion clause jurisprudence. Formal
neutrality in government decision making does not adequately
protect or promote religious liberty or equality. This principle is
as true for government spending decisions as it is for regulatory
laws.
It is true that formally neutral laws and spending decisions
do not distinguish between secular and religious beliefs or
among different religious faiths on their face. In a superficial
sense these laws require that everyone must be treated the same
way. In that formal sense, such government decisions are neutral
and evenhanded. But we know that this kind of neutrality is a
sham. Because different religious groups and individuals are not
similarly situated, these formally neutral laws undermine reli-
20. Exemptions for the kinds of activities funded through charitable
choice clearly create incentives that favor religious providers. For this reason,
Thomas Berg notes that a particularly difficult case for exemptions "is
presented by not-for-profit educational and social service activities of churches,
such as schools, shelters, soup kitchens, child care centers, and so forth. Here
churches undeniably compete with secular alternatives, and exemption can
potentially create an incentive to use religiously affiliated services." Thomas C.
Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 39 Vii.. L. REv. 1, 49 (1994).
Berg would still permit exemptions in these situations despite the
incentives they create, id., and as a general matter I am inclined to agree with
his position. My point is not that the exemptions should be denied. It is that
the incentives created by granting such exemptions cannot be ignored in
determining religion clause doctrine relating to state funding of religious
organizations. If the goal of neutrality theory is to minimize incentives, it is not
clear to me why constitutional requirements governing the award of direct
subsidies to religious organizations should not take account of the incentives
that are created when these organizations receive regulatory exemptions that
are unavailable to similarly situated secular groups.
21. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (1994).
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gious liberty and promote inequality. For religious liberty and
equality to be meaningfully protected, we have to look behind
the formal neutrality of the law and examine its real world effects
and consequences.
Yet Professor Esbeck seems to ignore this important lesson
when government spending is at issue. Far from incorporating
the doctrinal structure of pre-Smith Free Exercise law and RFRA
into the review of government spending programs, neutrality the-
ory seems to track the analysis of Employment Division v. Smith
quite comfortably. As long as state grants are distributed accord-
ing to some neutral criteria that on its face allows both religious
and secular organizations to compete for funding, Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause requirements are satisfied.23
It is difficult to understand the justification for this doctrinal
bifurcation between regulation and spending. When the govern-
ment denies unemployment compensation to a Seventh Day
Adventist or ajewish person because they will not accept work on
Saturday,24 the incentives created by this decision and the bur-
den it imposes on religious liberty seem obvious. Surely, similar
incentives are created when the criteria the government uses in
deciding whether to fund particular religious organizations for
the provision of welfare services requires the grantee to operate
its program on Saturday. Both decisions are formally neutral.
Both decisions are substantively unequal and unfair to religious
faiths that recognize Saturday as the Sabbath. Yet neutrality the-
ory apparently condemns the former and upholds the latter.25
23. See Esbeck, supra note 3, at 38.
24. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that it is
unconstitutional to deny member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
unemployment compensation because she refuses to accept jobs that require
her to work on her Sabbath).
25. While proponents of neutrality theory support the reasoning and
holding of Sherbert v. Verner, it is far less clear that they are willing to extend its
holding to require the review of neutral funding criteria that may make it more
difficult, if not impossible, for certain minority faiths to successfully apply for
contracts to provide social services. There is a continuum of burdens here. The
example in the text of a grant condition that requires the contracting party to
operate a program on Saturday is a particularly blatant illustration of a
requirement that would handicap Sabbatarians. Allowing such a direct burden
to be challenged under the authority of Sherbert, however, only begins the
inquiry. The decision to require a program to operate on Saturday may
accurately reflect beneficiary demand for the program and conventional
efficiency concerns as much as it suggests insensitivity to the religious needs of a
minority faith. Would it also be unconstitutional only to award contracts to
organizations that either operate on Saturday or demonstrate that they can
service a comparable number of welfare recipients at an equivalent cost as those
organizations that do operate on Saturday? Many religious organizations that
1999]
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By accepting without review all neutral spending decisions,
neutrality theory appears to ignore the fact that a religious major-
ity may be just as likely to create incentives that burden the
choices of religious minorities as secular decision makers. It is an
odd oversight.26  Sherbert v. Vernel 7 may be the strongest
Supreme Court decision protecting a religious individual from
recognize Saturday as their Sabbath in many communities could not
successfully compete for contracts under this criteria.
26. Some commentators on the meaning of the religion clauses
understate the dangers to religious liberty and equality that may result from
competition among religious faiths. They argue that the primary risks to
religious freedom result from the subordination of the interests of serious
believers of all faiths to an increasing secular social and political environment,
not from friction between religious groups. See, e.g., David M. Smollin,
Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern America: A Response to
Professor Perry, 76 IowA L. REV. 1067, 1091-96 (1991). See generally JAMES DAVISON
HUNTER, CULTURE WARs: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991). While I
agree that religious intolerance has declined in the United States during the
last half century, I believe these commentators understate the extent to which it
continues to influence personal beliefs and behavior.
Moreover, in my view, this perspective mistakenly construes the relative
absence of serious religious rivalry and antagonism in the United States during
the last few decades to be an enduring condition. A more comprehensive view
of history suggests that the absence of religious conflict in a society for one
generation provides little guarantee that the intolerance among faiths that has
plagued countries throughout the world for several millennia and American
society for most of its existence has been permanently stifled.
Moreover, while it is always problematic to ignore the lessons of history and
assume the continuation of current social conditions, basing a challenge to
existing Establishment Clause doctrine on the assumption that social peace
among the diverse religious sects that populate America will endure seems
particularly unrealistic. Establishment Clause critics, after all, condemn both
Supreme Court doctrine over the last forty years and the secular culture that
has allegedly prospered in its wake. See, e.g., RichardJohn Neuhaus, THE NAKED
PUBLIC SQUARE (1984); Smollin, supra. This is the same period, however, in
which religious toleration in American society has flourished and many
minority faiths have been able to shed much of their outcast status. Social
conditions have diverse causes, of course, and it would be foolish to attribute
current ecumenical attitudes among many faiths to any one factor, such as
religion clause doctrine over the last four decades. It also seems unrealistic,
however, to ignore the possibility that the very cultural conditions and legal
standards that the critics of current doctrine hope to change may have
contributed to the existing environment of religious toleration-the very
environment on which these critics ground their lack of concern about
religious conflict. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager:
Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 N.W.U. L. REV. 347, 348 (1995)
(challenging the assumption that "the benign character of American religion
owes no debt to the forces (constitutional or otherwise) that have tended to
dilute or marginalize . . . religion in America").
When the "SLOW DOWN-DANGEROUS BLIND CURVE AHEAD" sign
falls down in a storm, it may not be a wise decision for a Highway Authority to
save money by refusing to repair it on the grounds that there were very few
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incentives created by neutral law. But there is no reason to
believe that the good people of South Carolina who forced the
Sabbatarian petitioner in Sherbert to choose between unemploy-
ment compensation benefits and the observance of her Sabbath
were part of a hostile secular elite, habitually insensitive to reli-
gious concerns. On the contrary, South Carolina's laws were
structured in a way that guaranteed that no Sunday Sabbath
observer would have to confront the kind of predicament its sys-
tem created for Seventh-Day Adventists and Jews.
28
An additional hypothetical concerning the funding of reli-
gious and secular schools should help to illustrate the problem
here. Assume that the government in addition to funding the
public schools, allows different private groups, including reli-
gious groups, to bid for communitywide contracts to provide sec-
ular educational services to children. Tracking. the charitable
choice provisions, the law providing such funding allows any reli-
gious group receiving a contract to promote its faith at school
through private funding and to discriminate on the basis of reli-
gion in hiring teachers and staff. There are several religious
schools in the community already, but, not surprisingly, the larg-
est school, let us say it is Methodist, is able to underbid its com-
petitors and receives the contract.29 Now there will be two state-
funded schools in the community. One is a secular public school
and the other is a pervasively sectarian Methodist school that
accidents on the curve during the last ten years-the exact period when the
sign was in place.
27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
28. See id. at 406, 421 n.3 (noting that "South Carolina expressly saves the
Sunday worshiper from having to make the kind of choice which we here hold
infringes the Sabbatarian's religious liberty" through statutes mandating
Sunday as a day of rest and exemptions from Sunday work requirements
imposed during times of national emergency).
29. One of the criticisms directed at the charitable choice provisions is
that it will result in the disproportionate funding of larger, well-established,
religions to the disadvantage of minority faiths. See, e.g., Derek H. Davis,
Editorial: The Church-State Implications of the New Welfare Reform Act, 38 J. CHURCH
& ST. 719, 724 (1996). Recent research by Professor Monsma suggests that
these concerns may be well-founded. In describing the results of his study of
government funding of religious organizations providing public services,
Professor Monsma notes that "the smaller [religious] organizations-and
especially very small ones-clearly reported receiving much smaller
proportions of their budgets from public sources than did the medium-sized
and large organizations. This is true of all three types of nonprofit
organizations surveyed. Presumably the larger nonprofits, with their more
professional nature and more internal resources, are better equipped to pursue
and qualify for public funds. Or it may be a matter of the very small
organizations having less need for public funds due to their lower budgets and,
perhaps, stronger local support bases." MONSMA, supra note 3, at 67.
1999]
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teaches religion along with secular subjects (although the former
instruction is privately funded).
I recognize that the problem of state funding of religious
schools is a difficult question that is beyond the scope of this
paper. But surely a constitutional theory that identifies its pri-
mary goal as minimizing government incentives that influence
religious decisions should consider this result to be problematic.
Neutrality theory, however, appears to be "neutral" between this
kind of a funding decision and more egalitarian arrangements.3 °
If the goal of neutrality theory is to try to recreate as closely as
possible the religious decisions that would be reached by private
parties acting individually or through private agreement if the
government was not involved, these "neutral" arrangements for
funding secular social or educational services through religious
institutions seem starkly inconsistent with that objective.3"
Neutrality theory also ignores the incentives created by
allowing a religious organization to discriminate on the basis of
30. The rhetoric of neutrality theory continually conflates the process of
facial neutrality in the award of benefits with the result of an evenhanded
allocation of funds among diverse religious faiths. Thus, proponents argue, "If
a program of aid is truly neutral, then each individual's religious choices are
maximized while government's influences over those choices is minimized."
Brief, supra note 7, at 25. Similarly, it is suggested in the context of public
financial support for religious schools that neutrality theory will reduce
religious divisiveness in communities because by "permitting evenhanded
funding of a diversity of schools ... neutrality diffuses the need to quarrel and
contend." Id. at 29. One searches in vain when reading discussions of the
theory and its real-world operation for any principle that requires such
evenhanded diversity of funding among religious faiths or any empirical
analysis explaining why anyone should believe that equality in the allocation of
funds is likely to result from the use of neutral, but politically determined,
funding criteria. Certainly, critics of charitable choice from both the left and
the right have been dubious about the way funds will actually be distributed
under the legislation. See, e.g., Robin E. Blumner, Perspective-And Now, Welfare
for Churches, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at 4D (Florida ACLU director
arguing that charitable choice will disrupt the "harmony of America's religious
pluralism" because in many communities "the favored religion will get the
biggest piece of the taxpayer pie" and "resentment by the unfavored is
inevitable."); Timothy Lamer, I Gave at Church, WK.Ly. STANDARD, Jan. 15, 1996,
at 13 (conservative critic condemning charitable choice because "raw political
power will prevail" in distributing support and "whichever sects have the most
influence in each state will get the coveted funds").
31. Of course, absolute substantive neutrality or equality in spending
decisions among religious individuals, institutions, or faiths may be impossible
to achieve in practice. The government may need to have certain job functions
performed on Sunday, for example, and religious persons and institutions
observing that day as their Sabbath will be unable to provide those services.
While some inequality is unavoidable, the religion clauses can and should limit
the extent and impact of unfair allocations among diverse faiths.
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religion in hiring employees to perform public functions it has
contracted with the state to provide. Assume the public func-
tions at issue had previously been provided by the state itself or
by secular organizations prohibited by law from discriminating
on the basis of religion and that individuals of diverse faiths were
employed in the delivery of those services. Then the state sub-
stantially reduces the funding available to government or secular
providers and uses the funds it has saved to subsidize religious
organizations that have demonstrated their ability to successfully
administer similar services. Those individuals previously
employed by the state or secular organizations, who lost their
jobs when the state's funding was redirected, are told that jobs
requiring their expertise and background are now available from
the newly subsidized religious organizations-however, appli-
cants must pass a religious test governing both their beliefs and
behavior to be eligible to be hired. Where their previous
employers had some obligation to reasonably accommodate the
religious needs of employees on the job and no authority to dis-
criminate against employees on the basis of their religious activi-
ties off the job,2 now these employees must comply with the
religious mandates of a different faith on and off the job. Appar-
ently, from the perspective of neutrality theory, this change in
job opportunities and working conditions does not create incen-
tives that influence religious decisions."3
32. See, e.g., Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir. 1993)
(explaining Title VII provision requiring employers to reasonably
accommodate the religious practices of employees); WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF
COMMUNICATIONS, GUIDELINES ON RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE WORKPLACE,
Aug. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 475412 (describing requirements of
religious accommodation that apply in the federal workplace).
33. Proponents of neutrality theory suggest that the Court's decision in
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church offesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 479 U.S. 1052 (1987) resolves the issue of discrimination in hiring on the
basis of religion. See Esbeck, supra note 3, at 26 n.99. Amos, of course, involved
discrimination in hiring employees who would be paid with the religious
organization's own funds, not state subsidies. Indeed, the Amos decision has
been powerfully defended on precisely that basis. See Frederick Mark Gedicks,
Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv.
99, 114 (1989) (explaining how the use of tithing funds to pay an "unfaithful"
employee would undermine "the powerful concept that tithing is the sacred
means by which Mormons build the Kingdom of God").
More importantly, extending the holding in Amos to justify discrimination
in hiring with state funds ignores the fact that Amos was a difficult decision
precisely because there were religious liberty interests on both sides of the
dispute. See Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the
Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 75, 92 (1990) (noting that "the regulation being lifted to avoid
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The charitable choice provisions of the recent welfare
reform act implicate virtually all of the incentives ignored by neu-
trality theory that are discussed above. The statute permits funds
to be allocated according to facially neutral criteria without
regard to the allocation of resources among different faiths.
There are no constraints on programmatic requirements that
have the effect of precluding particular religions from participat-
ing. No attention is paid to the possibility that religious beliefs
and practices may increase the cost or impair the efficiency of
certain religious providers making it highly unlikely that those
faiths will receive contracts from the state. The incentives cre-
ated by any disparity of allocation among faiths are not taken
into account in any way. Similarly, charitable choice allows pub-
licly funded job opportunities to be offered or withheld on the
basis of religious beliefs or practices without regard to the coer-
cive effect of such inducements on the religious decisions of
employees. Thus, the same criticisms that apply to neutrality the-
ory are equally applicable to the charitable choice framework
which serves as a concrete manifestation of this constitutional
model in action.
B. Moving Beyond Liberty-The Role of Equality and Instrumental
Speech Values in Interpreting the Religion Clauses
Neutrality theory presupposes that the exclusive objective of
the religion clauses is the maximization of religious liberty. In
doing so, it portrays an incomplete picture of the Constitution's
normative structure. Religion crosses constitutional boundaries.
The protection provided religious liberty overlaps and must be
reconciled with other important normative principles that f!irm
the foundation of the Constitution's value system.
Religion is a multi-dimensional constitutional interest. In its
varying aspects, it implicates personal liberty, group equality, and
freedom of speech. In addition to protecting the freedom of
religious individuals and the autonomy of religious institutions to
follow the dictates of their faith, the Constitution affirms the
equal status and worth of religious groups and the faiths that sus-
tain them. Further, it protects the rights of religious and secular
individuals to espouse their beliefs on an equal basis with others
and to influence personal and public policy in a competitive mar-
burdening the free exercise of religion [in Amos] is a regulation protecting the
free exercise of religion").
For a more detailed discussion of the constitutionality of allowing religious
organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion in hiring staff with state
funds to provide public services, see Brownstein, supra note 1, at 231-39.
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ketplace of ideas. A theory for interpreting the religion clauses
that concentrates exclusively on personal liberty and ignores
these equality and speech values is inherently incomplete and
will often be mistaken in its application. Equality and freedom of
speech interests are simply too essential a part of the constitu-
tional framework relating to religion to be dismissed as irrelevant
or secondary.34 Yet neutrality theory appears to ignore both of
these interests.
1. Religion and Equality
Determining how the Constitution protects religious liberty,
equality, and speech is particularly difficult because it involves
two separate analytic functions. One job requires the develop-
ment of rules of demarcation among different constitutional pro-
visions including the religion clauses, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the prohibition against abridging freedom of
speech.3 5 The other job function relates to the interpretation of
the religion clauses themselves. Religious equality and instru-
mental speech values inform our understanding of the religion
clauses and help to give them meaning. The Establishment
Clause, for example, operates to protect religious equality in
important respects. In doing so, it subsumes and serves as a sub-
stitute for the development of equal protection doctrine address-
ing religious discrimination. 6
The Constitution guarantees religious individuals and
groups and the beliefs on which they base their identity an equal-
ity of standing very much like the racial and gender equality com-
manded by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amen dment.37 While a constitutional theory designed to protect
34. I have discussed many of these ideas at length in an earlier work. See
Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (attempting
to resolve whether constitutionality of tax statute providing a preference for
religious periodicals should be determined under Free Exercise, Free Speech,
or Establishment Clause doctrine); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 651-55 (1981) (reconciling requirements of the
Free Exercise Clause with free speech doctrine); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 324
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that prisoner's claim that
authorities provided support for religious services of other faiths, but not
Buddhism, does not raise issue under First Amendment but may support equal
protection review).
36. See Brownstein, supra note 34, at 102-74.
37. In discussing religious equality, I am primarily considering equality
among religious groups identified by their faith, not equality between the
classes of those who hold religious as opposed to secular beliefs. As I have
1999]
258 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
religious liberty will incidentally promote religious equality in
many cases, the values at issue here are entirely independent.
Because of this essential distinction, a liberty model cannot be an
adequate substitute for a constitutional principle that recognizes
the unique significance of equality as a constitutional value.
Religious equality is not premised on the right to choose to
be Jewish or Christian any more than racial equality is premised
on the right to be black or Asian. Its focus is on group member-
ship rather than belief, on religious status as opposed to religious
practice."8 Religious and racial equality recognizes a person's
racial and religious identity as a given characteristic and denies
the state the power to favor or disfavor individuals on that basis.
Discrimination is prohibited with regard to tangible benefits and
burdens and more intangible inequalities related to stigma and
status. Under equality principles, the government cannot pro-
mote a religious hierarchy by identifying people of a particular
faith or their beliefs as superior or inferior to others-even if in
doing so the government does not substantially burden the abil-
ity of a person to practice his or her faith.3 9
It is difficult to deny the necessity of recognizing religious
equality as a constitutional value of independent significance.
argued elsewhere, the classes of those individuals who hold religious or secular
beliefs are too diffuse in nature to invoke the kind of equality analysis provided
under equal protection doctrine. See Brownstein, supra note 34, at 112.
38. For equality purposes, a person is a Catholic or a Jew. For liberty
purposes, a person practices Catholicism or Judaism. Religion, for
constitutional purposes, encompasses both concepts. Both status and conduct
are intrinsic to the nature of religion and the relationship between religion and
the state. Indeed, for some religions, status, conduct, and belief cannot easily
be differentiated. See BETrE NOVIT EvANs, INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION: THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN PLURALISM 122 (1997)
(recognizing that "[flor members of some religions, probably Jews and
Muslims, the sense of 'peoplehood' is an overarching object of religious
commitment"); William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J.
CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 385, 386 (1996) (explaining that "religion clause issues
do not easily meld into traditional modes of constitutional analysis because
religious rights are often group rights and . . . part of the interest that the
individual seeks to preserve by the protection of her religious liberty is her
identity with a religious group").
39. See EvANs, supra note 38, at 134-37. Justice O'Connor's
"Endorsement" test for understanding and applying the Establishment Clause
comes close to expressing an explicit commitment to religious equality. See
Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), for the proposition that "direct
government action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is
invalid [because] it sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community").
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Assume, for example, that a city passes a law prohibiting any non-
Christian religion from building a house of worship taller than
the highest Christian church in the community.40 Surely, such a
law is unconstitutional on its face. Striking the law down as a
burden on religious liberty, however, stretches the idea of reli-
gious freedom in an unpersuasive way. Few religions, if any,
require that their house of worship must be of a particular height
or that they must tower over the sanctuaries of competing faiths.
It also makes little sense to suggest that a law such as this one will
have any substantial impact on any person's religious beliefs or
practices. No one is likely to change faiths or alter the number
of times they attend services because of the comparative height
of their house of worship. The law is unconstitutional because it
communicates a message of religious favoritism and inequality
that suggests the superiority of one faith over others. The law
constitutes status discrimination and is unconstitutional on that
basis, not because of its attenuated impact on religious liberty.
Reconciling the Constitution's commands regarding reli-
gious liberty and religious equality involves a great deal more
than simply adding one mandate to another. Liberty and equal-
ity interests are often in tension with each other. In specific cir-
cumstances, maximizing one interest may involve the
subordination of the other. Imagine that a school district
announced that student assignments for different schools would
be determined under the following policy. To maximize student
choice, no student would have to attend school with students of
another race unless they elected to do so. To achieve that goal,
the district will provide racially integrated and racially exclusive
schools as demand requires.
I have no doubt that this policy violates the Equal Protection
Clause.4 1 While it allows students the liberty to choose the racial
composition of the school they attend, it is unequal in its effect
on racial minorities. For equality purposes, majority and minor-
40. Historically, according to traditional Islamic law in certain countries,
"[i]nfidels should be forbidden to have houses [and, perhaps, houses of
worship] higher than those of their Moslem neighbors." MAHIUDIN ABu ZA MA1A
YAHYA IBN S-tA~iF EN NAwAwI, MINHAJ ET TALIBIN, A MANUAL OF MUHAMMADEN
LAw AccoaRDNG TO THE SCHOOL OF SHrArI (E.C. Howard trans., from French
trans. of L.W.C. Van Den Berg, 1977).
41. See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475 (M.D.
Ala. 1967) (noting that "a state may neither operate and maintain two school
systems-one integrated, one segregated-giving public school students a
choice between the two, nor simply go out of the business of running schools in
some school districts and allow that function to be undertaken by private
persons" in an attempt to avoid providing integrated school facilities for all
children).
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ity status matters. Maximizing personal liberty for the majority
may isolate the minority in educational ghettos. If we substitute
religion for race in this example, I would argue that a similar
analysis should apply.
I do not suggest that racial and religious exclusivity are exact
analogies for moral or constitutional purposes. While there are
some situations in which the motives and effects of religious dis-
crimination closely parallels racial discrimination as an expres-
sion of prejudice,42 there are obviously other situations where
there is a dramatic difference between the two. The point is not
that race and religion are always the same for equality purposes.
It is that equality and liberty are often conflicting values and that
the conflict between them commonly exists when either race or
religion is at issue. For both race and religion, at some point,
liberty interests may have to be limited to further equality
concerns.
Determining how religious equality is to be protected under
the religion clauses is a complicated understanding which can
only be sketched in this article. Infringements of equality for
religious groups mirror infringements of equality for racial, eth-
nic, and gender groups to some considerable extent. Stigma and
lack of respect are cognizable harms in both contexts.4" Simi-
larly, the fragmentation of public life along racial, ethnic, or reli-
gious lines is a matter of constitutional concern because of its
exclusionary consequences for the members of minority groups.
Religion is not like other suspect classifications such as race,
national origin, or gender in important respects, however. It has
a belief and behavioral dimension that is lacking in other suspect
classifications. Also, there is a distinct sociological and legal his-
tory of religion in American culture that underlies the protection
religious practices and groups will receive from the Constitution.
For the most part, issues relating to religious equality have been
subsumed under Free Exercise and Establishment Clause doc-
trine. Thus, equal protection jurisprudence, the primary source
of constitutional analysis relating to equality, has largely ignored
religion and the status and treatment of religious groups. While
I believe equal protection doctrine developing out of race and
ethnic discrimination cases provides a useful starting place for
understanding religious equality, existing equal protection case
42. See infra note 48.
43. See Kenneth L. Karst, Religious Freedom and Equal Citizenship: Reflections
on Lukumi, 69 TUL. L. REV. 335, 351-52 (1994) (describing status harms, stigma,
and the "hurt of exclusion" as "injur[ies] to equal citizenship" that raise Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause concerns).
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law cannot be conclusive in this area and many analogies will be
relevant but imperfect.
For example, unlike race, which is acknowledged to be an
irrelevant characteristic of individuals and an unreasonable basis
for government distinguishing between persons, religion is a
legitimately recognized and protected aspect of an individual's
identity. Accordingly, for racial equality purposes we promote
equality by ignoring racial differences, but for religious equality
purposes sometimes it may be necessary to take religious differ-
ences into account. Blacks and whites are similarly situated in a
way that Jews and Catholics are not.
4 4
In doctrinal terms, this means that the government does not
necessarily treat individuals unequally when it facially discrimi-
nates between them on religious grounds. No impermissible dis-
crimination occurs when only the Christian child is granted an
excused absence from school on Good Friday and only the Jew-
ish child is excused on Yom Kippur. In other circumstances,
however, facial discrimination among religious faiths may violate
equality guarantees even when the state's goal in treating reli-
gious individuals differently is to accommodate religious beliefs
and practices. When the granting of an exemption from a gen-
eral law confers substantial material benefits on an individual or
a group, as would be the case if the members of a particular faith
were excused from paying an onerous, but generally applicable,
tax, the state's action raises both religious liberty and religious
equality concerns. A religious liberty issue arises because the
exemption creates incentives that influence religious choices,
and religious equality is arguably undermined because the mem-
44."Equal common citizenship" involves the subtle relationship
between identity and differences. Sometimes equality means ignoring
irrelevant differences, sometimes it means taking relevant ones into
account. The problem, of course, is knowing which is which.
Differences are relevant, not in the abstract, but within social context.
Background conditions, such as economic status or political power,
may affect religious ones. In the United States, the difference between
Catholics and Protestants may be simply a difference; in Ireland, the
difference is one that conveys a power inequality. Once we are aware
of the background conditions surrounding religious exercise, we
recognize problems of status domination, selective indifference, and
downright animus as part of the context that must be taken into
account in order to preserve religious equality. These observations
help us appreciate what is often at stake when religious freedom is
threatened. Religious minorities are vulnerable to both intentional
exclusion and "selective indifference." The insistence upon a genuine
equality for a variety of religious expressions demands more than a
mere formal neutrality in government policy.
EvANs, supra note 38, at 237.
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bers of one faith are relieved of burdens that members of other
faiths must shoulder.
For related reasons, race and religion may differ with regard
to the constitutional analysis of facially neutral laws. Because the
constitutional understanding of racial equality is grounded on a
presumption of fungibility, neutral laws or spending decisions
that disproportionately burden or favor particular racial groups
are tolerated despite their incidental consequences. While more
members of one group or another may benefit from the law, the
benefit does not formally accrue because of a group member's
race. Thus, a facially neutral land use regulation may have a
racially exclusionary effect in a community because racial minori-
ties are disproportionately represented in the lower economic
classes, but a person's race is not a direct cause of that conse-
quence. Disproportionate impact of this kind violates constitu-
tional equality guarantees only if the state deliberately intends to
bring about such results.45
Religion is different. Unlike the disproportionate impact of
neutral laws on different racial groups where the disparate effect
of the law is entirely unrelated to the racial characteristics of
group members, neutral laws that disproportionately impact
members of different faiths often do so precisely because of the
differing religious beliefs and practices of religious groups.
There is nothing unexpected or fortuitous about the impact of a
decision to provide subsidies to organizations that operate pro-
grams on Saturday on religious groups for whom that day of the
week is the Sabbath.4 6 Similarly, while a neutral law such as the
45. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
46. In rejecting constitutional challenges to facially neutral laws unless
plaintiffs can establish invidious intent on the part of the legislature, the Court
appears to evaluate legislative motives in an unreasonably narrow way. To the
Court, laws that disproportionately burden a suspect class are adopted either
"because of" their discriminatory effect, an unconstitutional purpose, or "in
spite of" their disproportionate impact, a constitutionally permissible goal. See
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). There is a third
alternative, however. The legislature may not intend the disproportionate
impact, but it may be supremely indifferent to the fact that the effect of the
challenged law will substantially burden a particular group. And this
indifference itself may be discriminatory. The same burden that would
persuade the legislature to modify the law if it impacted the majority would be
cavalierly tolerated if it falls exclusively or predominately on the minority.
There is a strong argument that this kind of discriminatory insensitivity to
the unequal effects of a law warrants the Court's attention in equal protection
cases alleging race-based disproportionate impact. The Court's reluctance to
take disproportionate impact cases suggesting such insensitivity seriously in race
cases, however, may be explained, if not justified, on three grounds. First,
because of the overrepresentation of racial minorities in the lower economic
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land use regulation mentioned earlier may disproportionately
impact the people of one race more than another, it will not bur-
den every member of the adversely affected group. Some racial
minorities will still be able to purchase property in a community
with regulation-inflated housing prices. All seriously religious
individuals for whom Saturday is the Sabbath will be burdened by
a law requiring work on Saturday, however, and no Sunday Sab-
bath observers will experience any burden on the exercise of
their faith.4 7 Thus, unlike the equal protection analysis of race,
in certain circumstances neutral governmental decisions may
classes, affirming the rigorous review of neutral laws that disproportionately
impact blacks and other racial groups would require close scrutiny of virtually
all laws that discriminate on the basis of wealth. See Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. at 248 (expressing concern that the rigorous review of laws that
disproportionately impact racial minorities "would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor
and to the average black than to the more affluent white"). Second, undue
attention to the effect of neutral laws on different racial groups reinforces the
belief that racial differences exist in fact and that government must take
account of them in enacting law, a contention that is fundamentally
inconsistent with the Court's colorblind jurisprudence. Third, it is hard to
identify a way to measure discriminatory insensitivity. On what basis can a court
conclude that land use regulations that have an exclusionary effect on blacks
living in a community would not be adopted if they had a similar exclusionary
effect on whites?
None of these arguments, however, supports judicial tolerance for such
legislative insensitivity when religious equality is at issue. Here, there is far less
of a correspondence between religious identity and economic class so that the
Court's fears about wealth becoming an implicitly suspect classification are
misplaced. Moreover, unlike the colorblind principle underlying the
contemporary understanding of racial equality, the Constitution does not
suggest that religious beliefs and groups are fungible or that it is always
impermissible to take account of religious differences. Finally, there may be
sufficient examples of government accommodations of the beliefs and practices
of majority faiths, such as legislative attempts to mitigate burdens on Sunday
Sabbath observance, to suggest discriminatory insensitivity when laws are
adopted that substantially and exclusively impact religious individuals who
observe Saturday as the Sabbath.
47. A useful analogy here might be to gender, not race. In Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), the Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of
pregnancy and childbirth from the conditions covered by California's disability
insurance system did not constitute gender discrimination despite the obvious
fact that only women were in the class at risk from the exclusion. Just as many
commentators were unpersuaded by the Court's argument that the insurance
system was "neutral" as to gender, see LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CousTrrnrrioNAL LAw § 16-29, at 1577-85 (2d ed. 1988) (characterizing the
Court's decision in Geduldig as "so artificial as to approach the farcical"), one
might argue that it makes little sense to construe a law requiring employees to
work on Saturday but not Sunday to be "neutral" among religious faiths and
consistent with religious equality requirements.
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raise important constitutional questions if they disproportion-
ately impact people of different faiths, whether that impact is
deliberately intended or not. A law that requires public school
attendance on Saturday, while closing the schools on Sunday, is
facially neutral, but obviously operates unequally among reli-
gious groups.
Racial and religious equality are different in another funda-
mental way. Racial discrimination and differentiation is con-
demned in both the private and public sector. Except for limited
remedial exceptions, no state or private institutional interest in
taking race into account in civil life receives or deserves respect
today. Religion and religious differences are more complicated.
At least in the private sector, it is not at all problematic for peo-
ple of a particular faith to gather together and establish a house
of worship or school that is exclusively sectarian in operation and
membership. Indeed, many of us would affirm such activities as
a positive and good thing.
Recognizing that there is a good and necessary side to reli-
gious exclusivity, however, does not deny that there can be a bad
side to religious discrimination as well. Religious bigotry is just
like other kinds of discredited bigotry and prejudice and its man-
ifestation in discriminatory admission, hiring, and business prac-
tices, for example, deserves comparable condemnation and
regulation.4" What distinguishes racial and religious equality is
the good side of religious exclusivity-a condition that rarely if
ever exists in the racial context.
Of course, not every law that burdens one religious faith more than
another violates the Constitution. The challenge is to develop standards of
review and rules of decision that distinguish laws that raise serious equality
concerns from those where the state did not take religion into account in
reaching its decision and the status of different religious groups are not directly
subordinated by the laws' effect.
48. A recent article in The New York Times, for example, described the
history of anti-Semitism at Dartmouth College during the 1930s and 1940s. In
an exchange of letters between Ford H. Whelden, an alumnus from Detroit,
and Robert C. Strong, the Dartmouth Director of Admissions, "Mr. Whelden
complained that 'the campus seems more Jewish each time I arrive in Hanover.'
. . . Mr. Strong replied: 'I am glad to have your comments on the Jewish
problem, and I shall appreciate your help along this line in the future. If we go
beyond the 5 percent or 6 percent in the Class of 1938, I shall be grieved
beyond words.'" William H. Honan, Dartmouth Reveals Anti-Semitic Past, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 11, 1997, at A16.
The President of Dartmouth is quoted as saying, "Dartmouth is a Christian
College founded for the Christianization of its students" to explain the
College's decision to turn down Jewish students who applied for admission
solely because they were Jews. Id.
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Because it is sometimes reasonable and desirable to treat
people differently because they are of different religious faiths,
equality among groups defined by gender or national ancestry
may provide a better basis for understanding religious equality
than racial analogies. Unlike race, most of us see something of a
good side to taking national ancestry into account for private sec-
tor purposes in some circumstances. Sometimes national ances-
try-specific decisions may be appropriate even in the public
sector. Gender is even a more open-ended classification. Here,
government regulations that would be immediately rejected as
unconstitutional if racial classifications were used are arguably
valid if gender is substituted for race. Single-sex schools are one
obvious example. Racially segregated public schools are per se
unconstitutional. Single-sex schools raise much more difficult
constitutional questions.49
If neutrality theory is deficient in ignoring group equality
concerns, how would recognizing an equality dimension to the
religion clauses influence an analysis of charitable choice? Put
simply, there would be far more of an emphasis on equality
rather than neutrality. In part, this alternative emphasis would
recognize an essential difference between facially neutral regula-
tions or spending decisions that disproportionately impact reli-
gious as opposed to racial groups. More specifically, and from a
more conventional equal protection perspective, state funding of
sectarian religious organizations to perform public services might
be compared, for equality purposes, with the funding of organi-
zations oriented around national ancestry or gender.
Assume that private organizations ideologically committed
to espousing the virtues or perspective of a particular ethnic cul-
ture or a particular gender apply for grants to provide services to
the public. Federal law prohibits states from discriminating
against such applicants because of their ethnocentric or gender-
specific orientation. Government restrictions on the organiza-
tion's structure and expression are also prohibited. While the
services to be provided must be made available to everyone on a
non-discriminatory basis, discrimination on the basis of gender
or national origin in hiring workers with state funds is explicitly
permitted without regard to whether a person's national ancestry
or gender is even remotely relevant to the successful perform-
ance of the jobs at hand. Finally, contracts may be awarded on
49. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 n.7 (1996)
(suggesting that the Court would "not question the State's prerogative
evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities" by creating single-
sex schools); William Henry Hurd, Gone With the Wind? VMI's Loss and the Future
of Single-Sex Public Education, 4 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'v 27 (1997).
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the basis of facially neutral criteria even if that results in organi-
zations affiliated with only one ethnic group or gender in an area
receiving support. And this is true even if the one-sided alloca-
tion of funds is entirely predictable from the "neutral" criteria
employed to select grantees-as long as no one can prove that
the criteria used was deliberately selected to achieve a discrimina-
tory result. On equality grounds, I suggest that the state funding
of a Men's Job Training Center (but not a "less efficient"
Women's Job Training Center) or a Mexican Counseling Center
(but not a counseling center focusing on other ethnic cultures)
of the kind described above would be subject to constitutional
challenge, notwithstanding the fact that neither Center discrimi-
nated on the basis of gender or ethnicity in admitting applicants
to its program.5' Religious institutions receiving charitable
50. Even if a religious organization facially complies with
nondiscrimination requirements by admitting members of another faith to a
welfare program, it may be argued that the services themselves are not being
made equally available to everyone regardless of their faith. It may well be that
there are advantages to receiving services from a religious provider of the same
faith as the benefit recipient because, for example, the resonance of belief
between the provider and recipient creates trust and reinforces values that
contribute to the effectiveness of the program. Conversely, there may be
disadvantages that result from receiving services from a religious provider of a
different faith than the welfare recipient because the dissonance of belief
between the provider and the recipient creates suspicion and misunderstanding
that undermine the inculcation of values that would contribute to the success of
the program.
An admittedly imperfect analogy to the issue of single-sex schools may be
useful in considering this issue. Under current Supreme Court authority, a
public military college, such as VMI, operates in violation of equal protection
requirements if it refuses to admit women. Arguably, the school would also
violate equal protection requirements if it changed its policy and admitted
women, but took no steps whatsoever to accommodate gender differences, on
the grounds that it failed to provide an equal education to women students.
Certainly, Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in the VMI case presupposes that
some changes would be necessary in the military college's operation if
admitting women was to be a meaningful attempt to provide both sexes equal
educational opportunities. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 551 n.19
(noting that "[a]dmitting women to VMI would undoubtedly require
alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the other sex
in living arrangements, and to adjust aspects of the physical training
programs").
At least one commentator has argued that the Court's recognition that
VMI must do more than simply "admit women" to comply with constitutional
equality guarantees is a critical aspect of this decision. A judicial decree
requiring no more than VMI's "admitting women to an institution designed for
men's physical skills and unisex barracks living" would not adequately respond
to plaintiffs' equal protection claims because "it would put women in an
impossible position. Many women otherwise capable of meeting VMI's goals
might not be able to perform certain physical requirements designed for men.
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choice awards would also be vulnerable to challenge on similar
grounds.1
They might also resist living in barracks that provide no privacy protection ....
Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal
Protection Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VI, 50
VAND. L. REv. 845, 862 (1997). To avoid the inherent inequality of such a
result, "the "VMI] decision requires not only that VMI admit women who are
fit, but also that VMI make institutional changes in barracks living and physical
skill requirements to provide equal opportunity to women." Id. at 878.
51. The argument here is a bit convoluted but I think it raises important
issues. Using the example of gender as a guide again, it may certainly be
argued that if the state is going to directly support single-sex educational
institutions, it must subsidize both men's academies and women's academies.
In order to satisfy constitutional equality requirements, opportunities for single-
sex education must be at least roughly equivalent to be upheld. See United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 551-54 (rejecting the creation of military program
for women as a remedy for VMI's gender-discriminatory policies on the
grounds that "Virginia has not shown substantial equality in the separate
educational opportunities the State supports"); see also United States v. Virginia,
44 F.3d 1229, 1243-50 (1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting).
If the state does not operate the single-sex schools itself, but substantially
subsidizes private single-sex institutions, this equality mandate may still apply to
some considerable extent. Justice Scalia in his dissent in United States v. Virginia,
for example, argued that an honest application of the equal protection
principles set out in the majority opinion would require the invalidation of
public subsidies provided private single-sex colleges because "the government
itself would be violating the Constitution by providing state support to single-
sex colleges." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Scalia cites Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973), for the proposition
that the Court will not "distinguish between state operation of racially
segregated schools and state support of privately run segregated schools,"
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 599, and suggests that a similar analysis
would apply to state funding of single-sex schools.
Admittedly, there is some doubt that this analogy can be extended to
religious institutions providing secular services. Indeed, the Court's opinion in
Norwood itself distinguishes between state aid to racially segregated academies
and state financial support to sectarian religious schools. Thus, the Court
explains that "[h]owever narrow may be the channel of permissible state aid to
sectarian schools, it permits a greater degree of state assistance than may be
given to private schools which engage in discriminatory practices that would be
unlawful in a public school system." Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. at 470
(citations omitted).
It is also important to note, however, that the kind of support envisioned
by the charitable choice legislation is significantly different than the subsidies
for sectarian schools that the Court distinguishes from state aid to segregated
academies in Norwood. First, as the Court explicitly explains, it is "the leeway for
indirect aid to sectarian schools [that] has no place in defining the permissible
scope of state aid to private racially discriminatory schools." Id. at 464 n.7
(emphasis added). Charitable choice, in contrast, involves direct financial
subsidies to the religious institutions themselves. Second, the school aid
programs referred to in Norwood provided support to students attending any
private school. See id. at 469. Thus, to the extent that state aid indirectly
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2. Religion and Speech
While freedom of speech is in some respects a dignitary and
autonomy right, the primary purpose for protecting freedom of
speech is an instrumental one. Freedom of speech is the founda-
tion of a democratic system of government. Accordingly, govern-
ment must not be permitted to distort the marketplace of
ideas.52
benefitted religious schools, that benefit was available to all the religious
schools in the community. Again, charitable choice is different. Under the
"neutral" funding criteria it allows, state funds may be used to support social
service providers of some faiths, but not others, as long as the resulting
allocations of funds are not deliberately discriminatory. Third, and finally, the
Court in Norwood recognized that state aid to sectarian religious schools would
not be constitutional if the schools discriminated in admission on either racial
or religious lines. See id. at 464 n.7.
This final point is the most critical one. While there is little case authority
on the issue, it may be argued that this equality mandate extends beyond the
formal admissions policies of a program. Thus, to return to our gender
analogy, a state-funded service program that is identified as a men's or women's
program, that is explicitly directed at satisfying the needs and interests of one
gender alone, that extols the virtues of a particular gender, that discriminates
on the basis of gender in hiring all of its staff, and that overwhelmingly provides
benefits to persons of a particular gender may be subject to the same equality
mandate that is applied to schools that discriminate on the basis of gender in
admissions. If the state supports programs of the kind described above for
men, it must provide similar support and opportunities for women in the same
or comparable institutions. The fact that a state-supported "men's" program of
this kind is facially open to people of both sexes may not be enough to satisfy
constitutional equality concerns. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 50, at 878
(casting doubt on the constitutionality of a state-supported college offering
gender-neutral admission to all men and "all women willing to live without
privacy in the military style barracks and able to perform feats of great upper
body strength" in light of the Court's analysis in United States v. Virginia). Nor
would equal protection requirements be satisfied if it could be demonstrated
that the "men's" program was more efficient than a comparable "women's"
program and therefore more deserving of support.
Arguably, a similar analysis applies to religious service providers. If
pervasively sectarian religious institutions are going to receive state support for
the provision of services, as the charitable choice legislation appears to
contemplate, constitutional equality values require that the funding of such
institutions be distributed among the religious faiths represented in a
community so that opportunities for state-subsidized services in a religious
environment are equally available to people of different religious backgrounds
and beliefs. Mere neutrality in allocation criteria (where in theory the
allocational chips simply fall where they may and in practice allocations are
subject to political manipulation) is simply not enough for equality purposes,
and it is not enough if the proponents of neutrality theory are serious about
minimizing government incentives that influence the religious beliefs and
practices of citizens.
52. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
46, 55 (1987); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First
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In furtherance of this objective, the First Amendment pro-
hibits government from discriminating against competing private
viewpoints. No other government regulation of speech is as
strictly reviewed or as likely to be struck down. Indeed, in con-
ventional terms it is generally preferable to prohibit more speech
on a content-neutral basis than it is to prohibit less speech pursu-
ant to a viewpoint-discriminatory law."3 Thus, the Court's antipa-
thy to viewpoint discrimination seems premised on the
understanding that what is so reprehensible about viewpoint dis-
crimination is that it manipulates and distorts the marketplace of
ideas in favor of one set of ideas and against opposing
messages.54
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189, 198 (1983) (arguing that the First
Amendment limits "the extent to which the law distorts public debate").
53. See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. 1633,
1643 (1998) (holding that viewpoint discrimination is presumptively
unconstitutional even in a limited public forum or non-public forum in which
content discriminatory regulations might be justified). Compare Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding content-neutral ban on residential
picketing), with Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (striking down content-
discriminatory ban on residential picketing that exempted labor picketing from
its application).
54. Viewpoint discrimination also infringes personal liberty interests by
burdening or encouraging the individual's expressive choices. In the
Rosenberger case, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), cited by Professor Esbeck in support of
neutrality theory, see Esbeck, supra note 3, at 30-37, for example, one may argue
that by subsidizing secular but not religious periodicals with student fees, the
University of Virginia influenced religious students to couch their expressive
messages in secular terms. See Laycock, supra note 3, at 71 n.168. While the
University's funding system may well have created such an incentive, surely that
was not the primary constitutional defect with Virginia's allocation scheme.
What was most problematic about the refusal to fund religious periodicals was
its viewpoint-discriminatory nature and the resulting impact on public
discussion on the University campus. Government cannot favor or disfavor
private speakers on the basis of their viewpoint because doing so empowers one
side of a debate or disables the other. See id. at 72.
The Court's opinion in another important First Amendment case, R.A. V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (requiring the rigorous review of content-
and viewpoint-discriminatory regulations within a category of unprotected
speech), makes this point with particular clarity. For constitutional purposes,
the individual has a barely cognizable interest in expressing unprotected
speech, such as obscenity or fighting words. The application of strict scrutiny
review to content- or viewpoint-discriminatory regulations within a category of
unprotected speech is justified not by the impact of the regulation on the
individual speaker's expressive choices, but rather by the one sided distortion
of public discourse the law creates. See id. at 387-88; see also Alan E. Brownstein,
Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and
Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 553, 590-93
(1996) (arguing that content- and viewpoint-discriminatory laws are
constitutionally objectionable because they distort public discourse).
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Under the Supreme Court's freedom of speech analysis in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,55 private
religious and secular expression may constitute opposing view-
points.56 When they do so, under conventional free speech doc-
trine both viewpoints must be subject to equally burdensome
regulations and must receive comparable support. The same
analysis applies to the sectarian messages of specific faiths. Each
religion constitutes a viewpoint in competition with alternative
belief systems and must receive equal treatment.
It is not clear from the Rosenberger decision that religious and
secular activities must always be construed as a formal matter to
constitute competing viewpoints so that government attempts to
treat them differently will necessarily implicate the prohibition
against viewpoint discrimination. The Court's analysis in Rosen-
berger left many questions open as to when the holding of the case
should apply. It may certainly be argued, however, that the rea-
soning of Rosenberger extends far beyond the formal application
of free speech doctrine to discrimination among subsidized peri-
odicals in a limited public forum.
Indeed, proponents of neutrality theory see Rosenberger and a
line of free speech cases preceding it as establishing a principle
of even-handed treatment when government subsidizes secular
and religious private activities.57 Even if government support for
secular, but not religious, charities providing services to the poor
did not formally violate freedom of speech requirements, they
argue, constitutional antipathy to viewpoint discrimination
informs our understanding of the religion clauses and under-
mines the legitimacy of such funding arrangements. Religious
and secular beliefs are in competition across a broad spectrum of
American culture and the Constitution should not be inter-
preted in a way that distorts the marketplace of ideas by favoring
one world view or the other. At a minimum, this principle
should permit government to make financial support available to
religious and secular institutions on a non-discriminatory basis.58
55. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995).
56. Id. at 831-32.
57. In addition to Rosenberger, neutrality proponents cite Capital Square
Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); and Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981); among other cases.
58. See Brief, supra note 7, at 22-25 (arguing that Establishment Clause
constraints on the funding of pervasively sectarian religious organizations
"punish those religions that resist conformity to culture while rewarding those
groups willing to march in tune with the evolving cultural norms").
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Grounding a constitutional commitment to neutral funding
requirements on a freedom of speech foundation, however,
raises serious questions that neutrality theory does not ade-
quately address. The recognition that religious and secular per-
spectives constitute competing viewpoints creates a disturbing
tension between neutrality theory's two central principles: the
exemption of religiously motivated conduct from neutral laws of
general applicability (and the protection of religious institutions
from regulatory intrusions), and the insistence that religious and
secular individuals and organizations must be provided equal
access to government benefits and subsidies. The problem, of
course, is that providing special regulatory exemptions and insti-
tutional autonomy for the proponents of one viewpoint but not
the other raises constitutional concerns about the distortion of
the marketplace of ideas that are as serious as those that result
from one-sided funding arrangements.
59
Freedom from regulatory burdens empowers institutions.
It reduces their costs, and increases their ability to exercise
control over their members, attract new adherents, fulfill their
normative mission and, perhaps most importantly, main-
tain their sense of continuous and distinct identity.6' The ability
59. See William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled
Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 357, 389 (1990) (arguing that the
"favoritism toward religious organizations [exhibited by free exercise
exemptions] violates the central principle in speech jurisprudence that every
idea has equal dignity in the competition for acceptance in the market-place of
ideas").
60. The value of institutional autonomy to'belief-based and expressive
organizations operating within a social environment among competing belief
systems can be described from a variety of perspectives. I summarize several
below in this note. Ironically, some of the arguments that demonstrate most
convincingly that exempting only religious organizations from regulatory
burdens distorts the marketplace of ideas are suggested by writers who contend
that religious groups and institutions must be free from state intrusion. These
accounts establish the importance of organizational independence and
integrity to the maintenance of religious belief systems and values and the
difficulty of sustaining a religious identity without adequate institutional
support. Many of these same arguments, however, apply with substantial if not
equal force to secular beliefs and institutions. Regulatory burdens and
interference undermine the power and ability of nonreligious groups to
influence their own members and others to the same extent that they disable
religious groups and messages. Thus, a regime that exempts only religious
institutions from regulatory intrusions and burdens handicaps one side, the
secular side, of many debates and not the other.
Bette Novit Evans' recent book on the free exercise of religion performs a
valuable service in gathering and summarizing commentary that advocates
protecting the autonomy of religious institutions. As Evans explains, religious
groups and organizations serve "'as value generating and value maintaining
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agencies in society.'" EVANS, supra note 38, at 40 (quoting PETER L. BERGER &
RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING
STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC PouIcy 6 (1977)). To fulfill this function, they must be
able to distinguish and reinforce their own identity. Both requirements are
essential. Thus, "'Groups ... [must be able] to create boundaries between the
outside world and the community .. . in order to maintain the jurisgenerative
capacity of the community's distinct law.'" Id. (quoting Robert M. Cover, The
Supreme Court 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 33
(1983)). Of equal importance, the group's social institutions must be protected.
[A~ll religious traditions . . . require specific communities for their
continuing plausibility .... The reality of the Christian world (for
example] depends upon the presence of social structures within which
this reality is taken for granted and within which successive
generations of individuals are socialized in such a way that this world
will be real to them. When this plausibility structure loses its
intactness or continuity, the Christian world begins to totter, and its
reality ceases to impose itself as self-evident.
Id. at 43-44 (quoting PETER BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY, 46-47 (1967)) (altera-
tion in original).
Because "a religion depends upon the communities and institutions that
sustain and propagate it," id. at 121, interference with institutional autonomy
may threaten the survival and the integrity of the religion itself. Some intru-
sions are obviously debilitating. As Frederick Mark Gedicks explains, "When
the government intervenes in religious membership decisions on behalf of non-
members or nonconforming members, it 'kills' the group [by] causing it to
change a fundamental aspect of its character or even physically to disband." Id.
at 157 (quoting Gedicks, supra note 33, at 150). But the cost of intrusion is not
always apparent to outsiders.
State intervention into the affairs of a religious community fre-
quently destroys the daily development of a group's historical and the-
ological narratives. Accordingly, government regulation may seriously
distort the spiritual life of the community even when the state's
demands would not violate clearly identifiable doctrines, beliefs, or
practices. Such intervention breaks the link between evolution of
group meanings and group authority, and thus reinterprets and
recasts such meaning.
Id. at 163-64 (quoting Gedicks, supra note 33, at 144-46).
I find much of this analysis to be powerful and persuasive. But I suggest
that it applies to nonreligious belief systems and institutions as well as religious
ones. To the extent that religious and secular world views are in conflict in
some general sense, protecting the autonomy of religious institutions alone sub-
stantially distorts that competition in favor of religious beliefs.
Institutional autonomy and freedom from burdensome regulations
empowers and advantages religious groups in more mundane and material ways
as well. What is at issue here is not direct incentives, but rather relative advan-
tages that accrue to organizations exempt from costly regulations. As a general
matter, the anti-competitive burdens of government regulations are widely rec-
ognized, see generally RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND ECON. DEV. DIV., U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFF., REGULATORY REFORM-AGENCIES COULD IMPROVE DEVELOPMENT,
DOCUMENTATION, AND CLARITY OF REGULATORY ECONOMIC ANALYSES 1 (1998)
(noting that in 1996 OMB estimated the cost of federal regulations to be $200
billion per year); GENERAL GOV'T DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCr. OFF., REGULATORY
REFORM-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SMALL BUSINESS ADVOCACY REVIEW PANEL
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to engage in conduct that satisfies moral require-
ments and to perform rituals that demonstrate allegiance
to a belief system or deity without state interference reinfor-
ces viewpoints and demonstrates their force and authority.6"
REQUIREMENTS 1 (1998) (explaining that "small businesses ... can be dispropor-
tionately affected by federal agencies' regulatory requirements, and agencies
may inadequately consider the impact of those requirements on small entities
when the requirements are implemented").
From an economist's perspective, these constraints can influence "reli-
gious" and "political" markets as well as economic ones. As lannaccone, Finke,
and Stark suggest:
People can and often do change their religion or levels of religious
participation. As with other commodities, this ability to choose con-
strains the producers of religion. Under competitive conditions a par-
ticular religious firm will flourish only if it provides a commodity at
least as attractive as its competitors'. And as in other markets, govern-
ment regulation can profoundly affect the producers' incentives, the
consumers' options, and the aggregate equilibrium.
Laurence R. Iannaccone et al., Deregulating Religion: The Economics of Church and
State, 35 ECON. INQUIRY 350, 351 (1997).
William Marshall makes a similar point in more conventional terms:
[When] a religious organization invests in a business, seeks legislative
action, or promotes the candidacy of particular individuals for public
office, it is engaging in an activity in direct competition with secular
individuals and organizations. To exempt religious institutions from
strictures governing these activities is to place those enterprises not
excluded at a competitive disadvantage.... [This] favoritism concern
is most evident with respect to those regulations affecting the political
process, the media, or other channels for the dissemination of ideas.
William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren, Regulating Religious Organizations
Under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293, 324 (1986).
Other commentators focus specifically on the cost savings that result from
regulatory exemptions. See Congressional Power, supra note 15, at 104-09 (1997)
(characterizing religious exemption claims as "patent fiscal favoritism" that are
no different in effect than financial subsidies provided exclusively to religious
organizations); Greg J. Matis, Dilemma in Day Care: The Virtues of Administrative
Accommodation, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 574 (1990) (suggesting that "providing
extensive exemptions could disadvantage secular day care providers, with whom
the church-sponsored providers compete"); Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church:
The Police Power Versus the First Amendment, 64 B.U. L. REv. 767, 798 (1984)
(explaining how "exemptions from land use regulations and zoning laws may
provide a significant economic benefit to religious uses [and organizations that
confer] an economic advantage over [their] secular counterparts").
61. Once again, Bette Novit Evans' work, EvANs, supra note 38, provides
concise summaries of source material on this point. Thus, Evans emphasizes
the role of religious practices in communicating and strengthening religious
beliefs when she describes such practices "as ways we create, express, and
reinforce meanings," id. at 43, that are valuable to individuals precisely because
"they sustain shared meanings and identities" with a group or community, id. at
109. Indeed, Evans concludes that the importance of religious practices to the
maintenance of religious belief systems cannot be overstated. "'[R]itual is
often central to the ability of religious systems to transmit values and apply
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These rights have substantial utility for speakers in competition
with conflicting viewpoints.62
Because in so many contexts, religious individuals and insti-
tutions are speakers with a distinct message to communicate not
only to believers, but to the public, it is not easy to isolate the
religious practices of individuals and the institutional autonomy
of religious organizations from the messages that they both
express. Religion and speech are too closely connected and
intertwined to ignore the effect of protecting religious liberty on
freedom of speech concerns. I take it as self-evident that a law
providing adherents of left-wing beliefs regulatory exemptions
those values to control the conduct of adherents,'" she explains. Id. at 103
(quoting Howard M. Friedman, Rethinking Free Exercise: Rediscovering Religious
Community and Ritual 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1800, 1819 (1994)). "Without
participating in a social group that makes plausible the religious claims of the
believer, without its rituals, myths, and other legitimating practices, the
individual finds it exceedingly difficult to sustain the religion." Id. at 169-70
(discussing Peter Berger's analysis in THE SACRED CANOPY (1967)).
Studies of religion in such diverse disciplines as anthropology, sociology,
ethnology, and religion itself recognize the functional value of ritual in
reinforcing beliefs and maintaining group identity. See, e.g., Naomi Gale,
Religious Involution: Sacred and Secular Conflict Among Sephardic Jews in Australia,
36 ETHNOLOGY 321 (1997) (noting arguments of functionalists such as A.R.
Radcliffe-Brown and Bronislaw Malinkowski that "belief and rituals reinforce
tradition, strengthen ties between individuals, and enhance group solidarity");
Melissa A. Pflug, "Pimadaziwin" Contemporary Rituals in Odawa Community, 20
AM. IN AtuN Q. 489, 496 (1996) (noting that traditionalists "regard ritual ...
both as an ahistorical act tied to the classic practices of religious experts, and as
a contemporary practice with vital social, economic, and political effects");John
F. Priest, Myth and Dream in Hebrew Scripture, in Myms, DREAMs, AND RELIGION
48, 50-51 (Joseph Campbell ed., 1970) (noting the relationship between ritual
and myth such that "when the ritual ceased to be performed myth became
denuded of its original force and power and quickly was reduced to a form of
literary art").
62. As noted previously, proponents of neutrality theory apparently
recognize the importance of the freedom of speech principle that requires
rigorous scrutiny of viewpoint discrimination at least as it applies to government
spending. Indeed, free speech cases appear to be the foundation of their
insistence that government support to private organizations for the
performance of public services must be allocated on a non-discriminatory basis
without regard to the secular or religious character of the grantee. See Esbeck,
supra note 3, at 23-27. The principle is largely ignored, however, when
government regulations are the subject of analysis. Here, if neutrality theory is
taken to its logical conclusion, speakers and institutions espousing religious
viewpoints may be relieved of burdens imposed on their secular counterparts.
Yet expressions of concern about even-handed treatment between competing
viewpoints and perspectives in the marketplace of ideas are strangely absent
when neutrality theorists propose that religious practices and institutions
should be favored with regulatory exemptions that are not available to secular
organizations and activities.
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and a degree of regulatory autonomy not available to adherents
of right-wing beliefs would be struck down as blatant viewpoint
discrimination. Similarly, if a statute such as RFRA applied only
to Protestants and was unavailable to protect the religiously moti-
vated practices and rituals of Catholics, Jews, and Muslims, the
law would violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment as well as other constitutional provisions.6"
How then can Free Exercise exemptions or a statute such as
RFRA be justified under either the Free Speech Clause or the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? As a formal, doc-
trinal matter, the special religious autonomy endorsed by neu-
trality theory arguably challenges the most basic proscriptions of
free speech doctrine. a4 Indeed, if free speech doctrine prohibits
viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on the state's subsidizing of
private religious organizations despite the Establishment Clause
prohibition against direct state support for religious activities, as
the Rosenberger decision suggests according to some neutrality
proponents, 65 it is difficult to understand why free speech doc-
trine does not also prohibit viewpoint-discriminatory regulatory
exemptions for religious institutions and individuals notwith-
standing whatever Free Exercise or legislative accommodations
of religion are asserted to justify different treatment.66 Similarly,
63. See Leo Pfeffer, What Hath God Wrought to Caesar: The Church as a Self-
Interest Interest Group, injames E. Wood, Jr., READINGS ON CHURCH & STATE 127,
129 (1989) (analogizing religious groups to ideological interest groups because
"avowedly or not, [they] seek to translate their own particular hierarchy of
values into categorical imperatives for the community at large, including those
members of the community outside of their own respective folds").
64. William Marshall states the principle here as effectively as anyone:
Religious beliefs should not be entitled to special exemption from
neutral laws under the free exercise clause (unless similar exemptions
were allowed for nonreligious beliefs) because preferring one set of
beliefs over another violates the speech equality principle .... Giving
special protection to religion thus gives the views advanced by religion
a false vitality in the political marketplace and skews political debate.
Marshall, supra note 38, at 393, 401.
65. Amid Curiae in Columbia Union College argue, for example, that the
district court's upholding of the denial of state funds to a pervasively sectarian
religious institution is "in conflict" with the First Amendment principle
established in Rosenberger that "Government may not discriminate on the basis
of private religious speech content or viewpoint." See Brief, supra note 7, at 2-3.
More specifically, they argue that the "application of the 'pervasively sectarian'
test necessarily caused the [state] commission to deny assistance to and hence
penalized the expressional identity of fervently religious colleges." Id. at 3-4.
66. I think the holding of Rosenberger is more limited, but it is limited in
both respects; Rosenberger does not undermine religious exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability and it does not require neutrality in
government spending except in narrow circumstances.
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if free speech principles compel an interpretation of the religion
clauses which allows, but does not require, government to subsi-
dize (or refuse to subsidize) religious and secular institutions on
an evenhanded basis, it is difficult to understand why these same
principles do not justify similar discretion and evenhandedness
when regulatory exemptions are at issue. Under this latter analy-
sis, the Constitution would not prevent government from fund-
ing religious organizations once it elected to fund secular ones,
and it would not prevent government from denying religious
exemptions once it concluded that exemptions should not be
available for secular acts of conscience.
Again, I do not challenge the constitutional propriety of
providing Free Exercise exemptions for religious practices from
general laws or Free Exercise protection of the autonomy of reli-
gious institutions. I believe that Employment Division v. Smith was
wrongly decided and that the Free Exercise Clause often requires
that such exemptions be granted. My point is that the rigid for-
mal neutrality required by free speech doctrine in prohibiting
viewpoint discrimination is only an appropriate basis for evaluat-
ing differing treatment of secular and religious activities and
institutions in a narrow set of circumstances of the kind that were
at issue in the Rosenberger case itself. To apply this standard of
neutrality more expansively to review all governmental distinc-
tions between the secular and the sacred cannot help but jeop-
ardize Free Exercise exemptions and institutional autonomy as
well as important Establishment Clause requirements.
A more nuanced, alternative approach recognizes that reli-
gious and secular beliefs and practices need not always be treated
in the exact same way by government. Sometimes religious lib-
erty concerns justify treating religious beliefs, practices, and insti-
tutions more favorably than their secular counterparts.
Sometimes religious equality (and liberty) concerns justify treat-
ing religious activities and organizations in a facially less favora-
bly way than secular ones. Moreover, under this analysis, there is
no fair and logical way to adopt only one side of the equation.
Once the former conclusion is accepted regarding the special
status of religion for Free Exercise purposes, Establishment
Clause constraints on the funding of religious organizations can-
not be summarily rejected on the grounds that such a regime
facially disfavors religious perspectives.
Instead of insisting on neutrality between religion and secu-
lar beliefs and practices when spending decisions are at issue
while trying unsuccessfully to argue that religion should be rela-
tively favored in granting exemptions from general regulations,
an adequate theory of the religion clauses must take the special
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protection accorded religious practices and institutions by the
Free Exercise Clause into account in determining Establishment
Clause doctrine. This kind of holistic analysis is necessary in
order to avoid unacceptable distortion of the marketplace of
ideas and to maintain some semblance of consistency with the
rest of the First Amendment. The spirit if not the doctrinal core
of the First Amendment does not require that religious and secu-
lar beliefs and practices must always receive exactly comparable
treatment. It does require that on balance neither religious nor
secular perspectives should be so substantially favored or disfa-
vored that the ability of either to influence the polity or the com-
munity suffers unfair interference.
I recognize that this balance may be difficult to determine if
formal neutrality is rejected as the controlling standard. How-
ever, by arguing that Free Exercise exemptions are constitution-
ally mandated or should be adopted by statute, we are rejecting
formal neutrality. Having tampered with one side of the equa-
tion, there is no way to avoid the hard substantive work that must
be done on the other side to resolve the constitutional relation
between religious liberty and equality values and freedom of
speech.67
It is not clear that neutrality theory even recognizes this
issue, much less that it provides an adequate response. Certainly,
the proposition that religious practices and institutions should be
treated as the exact equivalents of their secular counterparts
when government 'spending decisions are reviewed, while reli-
gion receives a uniquely favored status when it is burdened by
regulatory legislation, does nothing to achieve the kind of neu-
trality between viewpoints and speakers that we associate with
free speech values. Indeed, under conventional free speech
principles, if a departure from neutrality is ever justified, we
would expect courts to require a result exactly contrary to the
thesis of neutrality theory. Government typically is permitted to
depart from content and viewpoint neutrality requirements when
it is spending state resources to communicate its own message. It
is in the regulatory context that viewpoint neutrality is most ada-
mantly required.6" In the inside-out framework of neutrality the-
67. The balancing process is particularly difficult because the rule against
funding religious organizations has positive as well as negative implications for
the communication of religious perspectives. The rule maximizes the purity
and independence of the religious message while reducing the amplification of
the voice with which it is expressed.
68. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2182-
84 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that government does not abridge
freedom of speech when it engages in viewpoint discrimination in spending
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ory where free speech principles require spending neutrality but
permit regulatory discrimination, the relation between free
speech doctrine and the religion clauses becomes entirely
unfocused. One cannot even be certain under neutrality theory
whether free speech principles justify the denial of regulatory
exemptions of religious speech from content-neutral restrictions
that limit the time, place, and manner of expression.69
The charitable choice provisions magnify this contradiction.
On the one hand, according to the statute, funding for public
welfare services must be made available to secular or religious
organizations on a non-discriminatory basis. On the other hand,
religious organizations and religious speech alone receive special
immunity from speech regulations imposed by government as a
condition for the receipt of funds, and religious organizations
alone are permitted to discriminate on the basis of religion in
hiring employees to perform publicly funded functions. If reli-
gious and secular beliefs and institutions are competing for the
hearts and minds of citizens, it is difficult to understand how this
system can be characterized as non-discriminatory, evenhanded
treatment of these two conflicting perspectives.
C. Challenging the Core Objective-Why Government Should Not
Always Minimize Its Interference with Religious Choice
The preceding discussion challenges neutrality theory on
the grounds that there are important constitutional constraints
on government other than the protection of religious liberty that
must be taken into account in interpreting the religion clauses.
There is a separate defect in neutrality theory that arises from an
entirely different perspective, however. Not only must the Con-
stitution be interpreted to do more than limit government influ-
ence over religious choices, but minimizing government
influence over religious choices may not always be the best con-
stitutional policy.
public funds because "[i]t is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer
subsidy" with regulations restricting speech).
69. It would seem that the exemption of religious speech from content-
neutral speech regulations should follow logically from the premises of
neutrality theory. Once it is accepted that free speech principles require (or at
least permit) government to subsidize religious institutions and activities
whenever it elects to fund comparable secular institutions and activities, but no
such free speech limitations preclude government from exempting only
religious beliefs and practices from neutral laws of general applicability, it is
hard to understand how or why providing such exemptions from laws
restricting expression to religious speech alone should violate free speech
guarantees.
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Sometimes government has an important and positive role
to play in promoting constitutionally cognizable values related to
religion that require it to impose some limits on private liberty.
Two of these values have longstanding constitutional traditions
that I have already discussed: equality for discrete and insular
minorities and freedom of speech. Respect for these values not
only requires that there be constitutional limits on what govern-
ment can do, it also justifies government intervention that
restricts the exercise of personal liberty.
An equal protection analogy may help to illustrate this
point. Suppose someone suggested that the Constitution
requires government to be neutral with regard to race relations
in the United States. The goal of the Equal Protection Clause
would now be to minimize government interference with the way
that people of different races interact with each other. Under
such a principle, government discrimination on the basis of race
would be prohibited, as would mandatory racial segregation. But
private racial discrimination in employment, private education,
business, and housing would all be permissible and protected
from government intervention. While the government would be
acting in a formally neutral manner pursuant to this policy, the
impact of this new interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
would not be neutral, of course. Its effect would be far more
damaging and burdensome to racial minorities than majority
groups. If we were trying to describe the harm that would result
from this new constitutional standard, we would probably con-
clude that it undermines racial equality.
Now consider an identical constitutional provision that
requires government neutrality with regard to relations among
the many religious faiths practiced in the United States. As
noted previously, because race is an immutable characteristic,
there is no racial liberty analogy to religious liberty. One does
not speak of the freedom to be a member of a race. Accordingly,
we might describe one harm that would result from rigidly pro-
moting the goal of religious neutrality theory through a constitu-
tional standard of this kind as the undermining of religious
equality. Certainly, there is some parallel between the treatment
of racial and religious minorities in American history. Catholics,
Jews, Muslims, and other religious groups have been victimized
by private discrimination in employment, education, and hous-
ing that is often religiously motivated, at least in part.70 These
religious minorities have depended on government intervention
to receive equality of treatment in civil society.
70. See Brownstein, supra note 34, at 106.
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Unlike race, however, there is also a liberty dimension to
religious discrimination. Discrimination against certain religious
groups by people of other faiths or adherents of secular beliefs
may well influence an individual's religious choices. If valuable
employment, housing, and educational opportunities will be
denied to individuals if they openly practice their religion, the
disincentive to their doing so seems apparent. Of course, the
loss of religious liberty here does not directly result from any gov-
ernment conduct, just as unrestricted private discrimination on
the basis of race does not constitute state action. My point is that
minimizing government intervention in these areas maximizes
minority vulnerability to the private infliction of the liberty and
equality harms I have described. Because of these costs, we reject
constitutional principles that require the minimization of gov-
ernment intervention when private racial, gender, or national
ancestry discrimination is at issue. Because private religious dis-
crimination imposes equally powerful equality burdens as well as
liberty burdens on religious minorities,7" we should also be wary
71. At least one predictable response to the race and religion analogy in
the text is that it unfairly treats racial and religious discrimination as moral
equivalents. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. Private racial
discrimination is almost always immoral and bad, according to this argument,
while religious discrimination is normatively neutral if not good. There is
nothing inappropriate about a house of worship restricting its membership to
only those persons who accept the religious beliefs of the congregation.
The argument is not as persuasive as it first appears to be. To begin with,
the problem is not religious exclusivity in religious congregations. It is
religiously restricted jobs, housing, and educational opportunities. A Catholic
or a Jew probably has no interest in joining a Methodist church and suffers no
injury if he is denied admission. If the Methodist Church owns and operates
the largest factory in town, skilled Catholic and Jewish assembly-line workers
may have every reason to seek employment there and will suffer significant
harm if they are denied employment because of their faith.
It is true that the sincere desire to operate a factory according to religious
principles and the desire to have a religiously homogeneous work force to
facilitate that goal may be neither invidious nor hateful and can be
distinguished from racial discrimination on that basis. That is only half the
story, however. It is also true that not all ethnic- or gender-based discrimination
in employment or housing or education is invidiously motivated. Of equal, if
not greater importance, some religious discrimination in these areas is
invidiously motivated. See supra note 48. In all of these circumstances, it may be
difficult to distinguish the benign purpose from the malevolent one. Finally,
whether the private actor's purpose is invidious or benign, the person denied a
valuable opportunity because of his religion suffers a real injury. A theory that
ignores both the possibility of invidiously motivated discrimination and the
harm to individuals denied valuable benefits because of their religion that may
result from efforts to minimize government interference with religious choices
is an inadequate basis for interpreting the religion clauses.
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of constitutional theories that limit government's ability to pro-
hibit such conduct or redress the injuries that it causes.
A freedom of speech analogy demonstrates the same prob-
lem with neutrality theory from a slightly different perspective.
One of the reasons courts uphold content-neutral, time, place,
and manner restrictions on speech, such as a permit system
determining the time and location at which different groups may
hold rallies at a public park, is that these speech restrictions facil-
itate freedom of speech for everyone. Without some kind of
rules governing who may speak in a particular place at a particu-
lar time, public discourse degenerates into shouting matches in
which the largest and rudest group dominates the discussion by
force of numbers. It is important to recognize that the state's
interest in these rules is not simply the general goal of promoting
civil order. The state's purpose is also to facilitate and protect
the meaningful exercise of the right to speak and to be heard.72
The state recognizes that it is sometimes necessary to restrict the
speech of some individuals in order for meaningful speech
opportunities to be available for others. A constitutional princi-
ple requiring government to minimize interference with the free-
dom of speech of competing speakers would undermine this
objective.
Both of these constitutional analogies suggest that any com-
plete theory of interpretation for the religion clauses must recog-
nize that other substantive values in addition to freedom from
government interference must be taken into account in order to
understand these constitutional provisions. The goal of minimiz-
ing government interference with religious choice is important
but incomplete. The government also has a critically important
and positive role to play in promoting religious liberty and equal-
ity by regulating private conduct. Minimizing government influ-
ence over religious choices may leave religious minorities
vulnerable to private coercion and discrimination.
Indeed, it is not only religious minorities that require affirm-
ative government intervention to promote religious liberty. Laws
requiring private employers to accommodate the religious inter-
ests of employees provide important legal protection for mem-
bers of religions of substantial size working for employers of
other faiths, of no religion at all, or who simply care more about
their profit margin than the spiritual needs of their workers.
One would think that a theory committed to minimizing govern-
72. See In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142, 149 (Cal. 1970) (noting that the
"[f]reedom of everyone to talk at once can destroy the right of anyone to
effectively talk at all").
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ment incentives that influence religious behavior would repudi-
ate such laws. After all, were it not for the government's
intervention, many employers would award days off according to
facially neutral criteria that further their business interests rather
than the religious needs of employees.
In enacting a law such as the one struck down in Estate of
Thornton v. Caldor,7 s which required employers to provide prior-
ity in taking time off to religious employees who observed a Sab-
bath day, the government was obviously engaged in removing
private disincentives that interfere with religious practice. There
is nothing neutral or minimal about the effect of such a law on
religious practice. Yet some neutrality theory proponents argue
that the law in Caldor should have been upheld or that its only
defect was that it favored certain religions over others."4 In
doing so they implicitly recognize that the focus of the religion
clauses should not be universal government deference to private
sector decisions relating to religion, but rather a substantive con-
stitutional vision that supports specific values.
While this criticism of neutrality theory is not as directly
related to problems created by charitable choice, because its pri-
mary focus is on government regulation, not spending, it does
relate to the general question of privatizing government services
through the use of private organizations performing public func-
tions. It is simply a mistake to ignore the role that public institu-
tions have played in integrating many religious minorities into
American public life. Private institutions, particularly private reli-
gious institutions, are often self-consciously homogeneous.
Taken to its logical extreme, systems that extend private exclusiv-
ity into public life and are completely respectful of majority
homogeneity provide little in the way of "choice" for many
minorities, charitable or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Neutrality theory and the charitable choice provisions of
welfare reform are directed at real problems in constitutional
doctrine and in American society. But both the theory and the
legislation leave too many unresolved gaps for either to be
accepted as an adequate response to the issues they address.
Neutrality theory simplifies religion clause jurisprudence by
73. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
74. See Esbeck, supra note 3, at 24-25 n.93; see also McConnell, supra note
3, at 181 (noting that the holding in Caldor"deviated from the usual principles
of constitutional adjudication" in striking a law down on its face when it might
be reasonably applied in many circumstances).
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF "NEUTRALITY THEORY"
ignoring important constitutional values. Indeed, it does not
even fairly and adequately protect religious liberty. State funding
of religious organizations is problematic. and controversial
because of legitimate concerns about the fairness of allocation
arrangements and the fear that politically powerful groups will
aggrandize state resources. The risk that funding mechanisms
may disproportionately favor certain religions and exclude
others raises serious issues about the incentives created by such
apportionments. Given the diversity of religious faiths in the
United States, a constitutional guarantee that only requires that
subsidies must be distributed according to formally neutral crite-
ria does not come close to adequately addressing this problem.
Neutrality theory ignores equality concerns entirely. Frag-
menting public services along religious lines raises serious equal-
ity concerns for minority faiths. Neutrality theory ignores this
issue. Discrimination in hiring on the basis of religion that
denies qualified persons valuable job opportunities solely
because they are of the wrong religious faith goes to the core of
constitutional equality principles. Yet under neutrality theory,
government may authorize private religious organizations that
contract with the state to perform secular public functions to use
the state funds they receive to hire only those employees who
satisfy sectarian religious standards. Leaving aside the traditional
separationist concerns-that allowing religious groups to com-
pete for government funding to hire persons of only one reli-
gious faith to perform public functions generates political
divisiveness, creates opportunities for religious coercion, pro-
motes dependency by religious institutions on state support, and
entangles government and religion-there is nothing in neutral-
ity theory that suggests that the potential exclusionary effect of
such policies is of constitutional significance. The burden on
people of minority faiths of a system that allows majoritarian reli-
gious organizations to exercise their liberty by reserving jobs
funded by state resources for persons of their own faith is not
recognized in any way.
Neutrality theory also ignores the likelihood that combining
regulatory exemptions for religious groups with state support for
their activities will distort the marketplace of ideas. There is
nothing neutral about immunizing religious voices or religious
activities and institutions from regulatory restrictions that limit
the expression of secular messages and speakers. This freedom
of speech problem is only exasperated when private organiza-
tions are permitted to use government largess as an incentive to
capture audiences for the receipt of their messages.
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Finally, neutrality theory avoids the reality that the members
of minority religions need government to police private conduct
that interferes with their ability to find employment, places to
live, educational and recreational opportunities, and all the
other goods and services provided by the private sector that make
up so much of American life. Minimizing the role of govern-
ment in influencing religious choices only maximizes the liberty
of those religious groups that are powerful enough to protect
their own interests against private interference with their faith.
Other values need to be taken into account in determining the
appropriate role of government relating to religion if the sub-
stantive objective of our constitutional vision is a society in which
the people of diverse religious faiths worship as they choose
while living and working together on the basis of equal worth
and mutual respect.
